The most likely reason MH370 went missing
The
disappearance of Malaysia Airlines MH370 10 days ago highlights six
mainly aviation security problems that need to be addressed.
The
first was on the ground, with lax passport checking against the Interpol stolen
passport database - although that probably would not have affected the outcome
here.
Second
was information management, which raised hopes and dashed them again, and
created confusion about what to believe and what not to believe. For example,
for several days we were told by Malaysia Airlines that there were five
no-shows for Flight MH370 whose baggage was offloaded. Malaysian police later
said this was incorrect and there were not any no-shows. Malaysia withheld for
several days vital ACARS and transponder information that could have helped the
countries searching for the aircraft, and so on. Malaysia was not helped by the
international media continually publicising advice from technical experts,
leaks from inside the investigation, and sniping from the sidelines.
Third,
we need to revisit the cockpit door issue. Reinforcing the door was a good idea
to keep out 9/11-style hijackers, but undermined by the door being opened for
toilet needs, refreshment breaks, and crew handovers on long-haul flights.
Someone on the cockpit side of the reinforced door can now keep out anyone trying
to gain access to the cockpit for the right reasons. This happened as recently
as last month, when the co-pilot of an Ethiopian Airlines plane
flying from Addis Ababa to Rome locked the pilot out of the cockpit and flew
the plane to Switzerland to seek asylum.
Fourth
is the mental health of the pilots, which should be regularly reviewed –
possibly every six months. I have heard from pilots that flying long
distance on autopilot is excruciatingly boring and can cause fixation and
stress problems. There appear to be inadequate studies on the effects of
frequent long-haul flights on pilots or, for that matter, the health effects on
flight crew of regular high-altitude cosmic and solar radiation exposure.
Fifth,
no one on an aircraft should be able to disable the ACARS or transponder (as
the 9/11 hijackers also did).
Sixth
is the issue of Air Security Officers (ASOs) or flight marshals on
international flights. Governments, including the Australian government, have
been cutting back funding in this area and it is probable now that not more
than 5 per cent of international flights have ASOs on board. An ASO on Flight
MH370 could have made a difference – provided, of course, he or she was able to
open the cockpit door.
Clive
Williams is a Visiting Professor at the ANU's Centre for Military and Security
Law and an Adjunct Professor at Macquarie University's Centre for Policing,
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT).
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